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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LJ\KE CITY, a municipal I 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY 
LOVEJOY,~aTHELMA 
ALLRED, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10752 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Utah Municipal League, Utah State Associa-
tion of County Officials, and the Salt Lake County 
Bar Legal Services, Inc., submit the fallowing brief 
amicus curiae in support of Salt Lake City's petition 
for rehearing. 
The interests of all cities and local governments 
in the State of Utah are directly concerned in this suit. 
The Court has adopted a hasty position as the rationale 
1 
behind its deeision in this case which if carried to its 
logical extreme ~would seriously cripple municipal and 
local guyernment at a time when the cities and towns 
of this state, and indeed the nation as a whole, are badly 
in need of opportunities to attempt flexible alternative 
solutions to their many problems. 
ISSUE OF CONTENTION 
The Court's initial decision in the instant case ruled 
that Subsections 7 and 8 of Title 32 Chapter 2, Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965~ were unconstitu-
tional. The crux of the Court's decision and the part 
that is of questionable rationality states: 
"We are of the opinion that the State by en-
acting comprehensive and complete laws per-
taining to sexual offenses has pre-empted that 
field. It does not appear that the State intended 
that municipalities deal with these offenses ex-
cept in those areas pertaining to prostitution 
where the legislature had made specific grants 
of authority to municipalities as set forth above. 
"It is elementary that municipalities are lim-
ited by express grants of power from the legis-
lature or as necessarily implied from such grants. 
It appears that the ordinance we have under 
consideration gties beyond the g1;ant of any leg-
islatiYe authority granted to the City and is 
therefore invalid. It must be conceded that the 
legislature did not intend to grant to cities the 
authority to prohibit acts of misdemeanors which 
the State has denounced as felonies. 
2 
''Our decision representing the ordinance will 
in no way hamper the police in dealing with 
vice as it is the duty of the police officers to en-
force State law as well as municipal ordinances." 
Thus the Court has a pp lied for the first time in 
the history of Utah jurisprudence the concept of "pre-
emption by implication." Nowhere in the Utah Criminal 
Code (Title 76 Utah Code Ann. 1953) of the State 
of Utab is there any express declaration by the Legis-
lature that that portion of the Code relating to sexual 
offenses (Chapter 53, Title 76, Utah Code Ann. 1953) 
was extended to pre-empt the cities, towns and counties 
of this State from passing ordinances relating to sexual 
offenses not inconsistent with State law. Indeed, as 
will be seen later the provisions of State law governing 
sexual offenses were not passed at the same time, but 
were passed sporadically and in such a fashion that 
it could never be said that at any time did any one 
legislator or the Legislature itself intend to pre-empt 
the area. 
It is the ominous and serious implications attendant 
to the concept of State pre-emption with which the 
amicus parties are concerned. 
PRE-ElVIPTION IN UTAH LAVV 
It is submitted that the concept of State pre-
emption is alien to prior precedents from this court. 
In A 11ierican Fork v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134 
Pac. 739 ( 1913), American Fork City, in the face of 
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extensive State liquor regulation (Utah Laws 1911, 
Chap. 10() Sec. 65), passed an ordinance prohibiting 
the sale of intoxicating liquors. The court rejected a 
contention that American Fork could not prohibit the 
sale of liquor merely because the State law also con-
tained some regulation of the matter. Quoting from 
Salt Lake City v. Flowe, 37 Utah 170, 106 Pac. 705 
(1912), the court observed: 
"The Legislature could confer police powers 
upon the municipality over subjects within the 
provisions of existing state laws, and authorizes 
it, by ordinance, to prohibit and punish acts which 
are also prohibited and punishable as misde-
meanors under the general statutes of the state.'· 
The Court then went on to note: 
"The overwhelming weight of authority in 
this country is to the effect that, where such 
power is conferred upon municipalities, they 
may prohibit and punish the same acts that are 
prohibited and punished by the state laws, al}d 
may impose the same penalties imposed by the 
state laws, if within the jurisdiction of the 
municipal courts." 
In the same case the Court expressly noted: 
"The California cases cited by counsel can be 
gi,·en no weight under the statutes of this state." 
The concept of pre-emption has had a long history 
of application in California. Note, The California City 
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·cersus Preemption by Implication, 17 Hastings L. J nl. 
G03 ( 1966) . 
Although in the Charier case the statute in ques-
tion seemed to dearly confer the power of municipal 
regulation, it is noteworthy that the court seemed to 
indicate the absence of any conflict between State law 
and local ordinance would allow a city to pass an ordi-
nance on the very same subject the State had legis-
lated on if there was any reasonable grant of authority 
to local governments for such regulation. 
A similar result was reached in Tooele City v. 
II off man, 4<2 Utah 596, 134 Pac. 558 ( 1913). In addi-
tion the Court observed as to the Charlier case: 
"\Ve there held that a municipality may pro-
hibit and punish acts which are also prohibited 
and punished as misdemeanors under general 
statute of the state, and that it may prescribe 
a fine and penalty for a violation of its ordinance 
the same as or different from that prescribed 
by the statute for a violation of the statute re-
garding the same subject-matter, providing the 
fine or penalty prescribed by the municipality 
is within the power conferred upon it to pre-
scribe fines and penalties." 
Thus the Court even recognized the power of a 
city to proscribe a different penalty than State law. 
During the same time span, in Salt Lake City v. 
Duran, 42 Utah 401, 131 Pac. 636, (1913), this court 
upheld the power of Salt Lake City to pass an ordi-
nance controlling gambling even though a State law 
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comprehensively covered the matter.< 1> In doing so the 
court noted: 
''ln making this statement, we are not un-
mindful of the general rule that city authorities 
may exercise such powers only as are expressly 
conferred, or necessarily implied. 'Ve think the 
power to suppress slot machines is clearly and 
intentionally conferred by what is said in sub-
division 40 of section 206, supra. 
"Nor do we think that the power to suppress 
gambling by cities authorities is limited to the 
precise games mentioned in section 4261. In our 
opinion the city authorities are given the express 
power to suppress all gambling and gambling 
devices regardless of whether they are enume-
rated in or in express terms covered by said 
section or not. There is absolutely nothing con-
tained in the Constitutoin of this state which 
prevents the legislature from conferring power 
upon the cities of this state to suppress all forms 
of gambling. The power to do so is clearly given 
in the statute to which we have referred. Under 
the power thus given, we think the cities of the 
state to which the statute applies not only have 
the power to punish all gambling which is pun-
ishable by the state law ( lVIcQuillin, Mun. Ord. 
sec. 500), but they may also suppress gambling, 
(1) It should be noted in respondent's brief in the case - p. 403, 
42 Utah Repol'ts, cases are cited holding a city may punish 
as a misdemeanor the same conduct the state punishes as 
a felnny. The concept may be based upon the theory that 
the city and State are separate sovereigns for double jeopardy 
purposes. See Gross, Successive Prosecutions by City and 
State. The cases nationally appear split. McQuillin, Munici-
pal Corporations, ~ 17.15. The dicta in Utah cases appears 
in conflict. See Salt Lake City v. Howe, supra, and com-
pare with the language in Tooele City v. Hoffman, supra. 
The decision in State v. Carnea, 44 Utah 353, 140 Pac. 670, 
involved conflicting state statutes and did not raise the issue 
here raised. 
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gambling devices, and games that are not enume-
rated in the state law. That is, under such a 
power, as it is expressed by the Supreme Court 
of California in Ex parte Hong Shen, 98 Cal. 
681, 33 Pac. 799, 'there may be different regu-
l_ations without conflict,' covering the same sub-
Ject matter, one for the cities and another for 
the state at large. Or as is said in 28 Cyc. 701: 
'Additional regulation by the ordinance does not 
render it void.' " 
In Zamata v. Browning. 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 
1057 ( 1918), the court refused to find that State as-
smnption of control of alcoholic beverages impliedly 
removed the right of cities to also control the area. ( 2) 
In Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P. 2d 
671 ( 1938) this Court upheld the power of Salt Lake 
City to pass an ordinance regulating drunk driving, 
although the Legislature had passed a State law on 
the subject. The Court upheld the cities' power under 
15-8-30 and 15-8-84 RSU 1933.0) In Kusse this court 
stated: 
"An ordinance dealing with the same subject 
as a statute is invalid only if prohibited by the 
statute or inconsistent therewith." 
There is nothing in the Salt Lake City Ordinances 
under 32-2-1, (1965) which is contrary to State law 
nor does State law expressly prohibit the passage of 
such ordinances. Further, supplementary regulation 
(2) It may be that this case could be said to turn on Ogden City's 
"home rule" charter, but the opinion does not clearly so 
indicate. 
(3) The cited statute is currently 10-8-84, U.C.A. 1953. 
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not disallowed is proper with reasonable legislative 
grant. Salt Lake City v. Doran, supra. 
Although in Pleasant Grove v. Lindsay, 41 Utah 
154, 125 Pac. 389 (1912), this court did not seem to 
allude to a concept of implied pre-emption it was in 
a most special context. That of terminating a prosecu-
tion under a city ordinance impliedly repealed by a 
subsequent State law, although the State law did not 
prohibit prospective regulation of the same subject 
matter. The case offers no real support for the appli-
cation of pre-emption now and is greatly weakened if 
not rejected by subsequent case law. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that Utah 
case law does not support the pre-emption concept in 
Utah law absent ( 1) express pre-emption or ( 2) a 
case where because of the nature of the activity regu-
lated no other regulation except uniform state regula-
tion would be feasible. 
STATUTORY PRE-EMPTION 
It is further submitted that the Utah statutes do 
not pre-empt the area of sexual offense or prostitution 
control from local action or evidence any legislative 
intent to do so. 
First, nowhere in Chapter 53, Title 76, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, is there any prohibition against agree-
ing to perform an act of prostitution nor prohibiting 
prostitution as such, except to the extent the conduct 
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might constitute fornication and violate 76-53-5 
' U.C.A., 1953, or in particular circumstances adultery, 
7u-53-3, U.C.A., 1953. 
Secondly, the great majority of statutes in Chap-
ter 53, Title 76, U.C.A., 1953, were carryovers from 
territorial laws and were enacted by the first Legis-
lature in 1898. Such was the case with the statutes 
governing adultery and fornication, 76-53-3 and 5, 
U.C.A., 1953, (RS. 1898 §§ 4210, 4212). Certainly 
at that time the Legislature could not have intended 
to preclude cities and towns as well as other local 
governments from enacting ordinances dealing with 
sexual offenses since at the same time both cities and 
towns were given authority to enact such laws, 10-
8-·H, 51, U.C.A., 1953 (RS 1898, §§ 206 Sub. 40 and 
54<); 10-13-9, 11, U.C.A.,1953 (RS 1898 § 302 Sub . 
. 8 and 10). Thus at the same time State laws were 
being enacted in the same general area, local bodies 
were given express authority to deal with the prob-
lem of prostituton and sexual improprieties including 
obscenity and lewdness. In addition a simple perusal 
of the same general parts of Title 10, Chapter 8, 13 
and Title 76 will demonstrate that at the same time 
the Legislature passed many other State laws dealing 
with control of tobacco, assault and battery, etc., it 
also gave cities and towns authority to deal with the 
same areas, thus evidencing no intention to pre-empt 
local authority in acting in similar areas. 
The provisions of Title 76, Chap. 53, U.C.A., 
1953, dealing with pandering, placing a wife in a house 
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of prostitution, profiting off the earnings of a fallen 
1voma11, detaining in a house of prostitution, and trans-
portation for prostitution were enacted in 1911. During 
the same Legislature the powers of cities and towns 
lo deal with prostitution and sexual misconduct were 
expanded and re-enacted (L. Utah, 1911, Ch. 120 § 1, 
Ch. 100 § 1, Ch. 123 § 1). Under these circumstances 
it could hardly be said any concept of State pre-emption 
was intended, or any intent to narrowly circumscribe 
the powers of local government to deal with prosti-
tution or comparable sexual misconduct. 
76-71-1 (10), U.C.A., 1953, provides: 
"Every common prostitute and every woman 
who from the doorways on the streets or any 
other place solicits men for immoral purposes." 
This provision was also first enacted in 1898 (R.S. 
1893 § .Ji-k72), but without the reference to "solicitation 
for immoral purposes". That language was added in 
1909 (L. 1909, Chap. 5 § 1). Consequently, at the 
time 7u-61-l, U.C.A, 1953, was first passed the local 
municipalities were also given power to regulate the 
same matter, and subsequent to 1909 their authority 
in the same area was expanded and re-enacted. Con-
sequently, no claim for pre-emption came from the 
Legislative history of the laws dealing with sexual 
offenses and prostitution in general. 
In addition the Legislature saw fit to pass statutes 
allowing the suppression of brothels as a nuisance. These 
statutes, Title 47, Chapter 1, U.C.A., 1953, were not 
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passed until 1913 and appeared merely to provide an-
other alternative remedy for dealing with the same 
problem and do not seem to preclude local suppression 
of brothels or houses of prostitution since no effort 
was made to replace those sections allowing local com-
munities to suppress houses of prostitution. 
One of the most striking realizations is that the 
modern innovator the "call girl" in her customary 
practice of being the solicitee is completely free of 
regulation under State law, except if proof of fornica-
tion can be had which is virtually impossible. 
THE CONCEPT OF PRE-EMPTION AS 
APPLICABLE TO THE REGULATION 
OF PROSTITUTION 
The basic concept of pre-emption is alien to the 
area where the court's decision has a pp lied it. Nothing 
in the legislative history of the enactment of the laws 
regulating sexual offenses in the State of Utah evi-
dences any express or implied intent on the part of the 
Legislature to preclude local governments from also 
attempting to suppress the difficult social problem of 
the sex offender. Generally, before the concept of pre-
emption is applicable it must be demonstrated that 
there is some special need for uniform regulation for 
exclusion of local governments. For example, the 
United States Supreme Court has found that a concept 
of federal pre-emption which precludes states activi-
ties is necessary in the field of labor law for uniformity 
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in <lealing with problems of such broad scope of labor-
m;:uagement relations. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 
346 U.S. 485 ( 1953) . No such necessity for uniform 
regulation is perceived with reference to the control 
of prostitution or its allied activities or sex offenses 
which necessarily have historically been a matter for 
local suppression. The very concept of pre-emption 
is incompatible with the subject matter in the instant 
case. ( 1) It is therefore submitted that since the subject 
matter of the instant controversy involves the exercise 
of police powers that in the absence of some very com-
pelling need for uniformity a determination that state 
law has pre-empted municipal activity in the area is 
not well taken. 
The Utah State Legjslature meets for only sixty 
days every biennium. All of the minor problems which 
may confront police authorities in various municipali-
ties cannot be adequately treated during a State legis-
lative session. Any innovations in criminal activities 
which are constantly occurring require some flexibility 
in order to avoid serious injnry to the community. Local 
governments have the capacity of providing flexible 
alternatives to the meeting of local problems. Various 
forms of solutions may be attempted by municipal 
governments as local needs dictate. An excellent test-
ing ground for governmental solutions to community 
problems is therefore provided by allowing local gov-
ernments reasonable flexibility in meeting their par-
( 4) For an excellent discussion of the federal rule of the pre-
emption doc1rin2, see Flynn, Federalism and State Antitrust 
Regulation, Chapter III, 1964. 
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ticular problems. The doctrine of pre-emption is alien 
to this concept. In California pre-emption has caused 
a hodge-podge of confusion and has been: 
"Criticized by local officials, who contend 
that, as a result of these cases, much of their 
local law is of questionable validity. One city 
attorney has pointed out that uncertainty in 
the law not only hampers enforc~ent officers, 
administrators, attorneys, and judges, but also 
confuses most of the public who no longer know 
how much of their conduct is regulated by local 
laws." 17 Hastings L. J., supra, p. 603. 
It would therefore seem inappropriate to apply and 
give sustenance to the concept of pre-emption in the 
absence of a rather obvious intent on the part of a 
Legislature for the invocation of the rule or where a 
matter commands the application of uniform State 
law. Since the criteria are absent in the instant case the 
invocation of the concept of applied pre-emption is 
most inappropriate. 
PARTICULARS OF THE INSTANT CASE 
Amicus Curiae are primarily concerned with so 
much of the court's opinion that indicates that the 
State of Utah has pre-empted the field of regulation 
relating to sexual offenses except to the extent of very 
narrow delegations implied in the Court's opinion an<l 
drawn from the language of the statutes relating spe-
cifically to prostitution. Amicus Curiae submit that the 
concept of the pre-emption should not be deemed 
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applicable to the instant circumstances ·with reference 
to the particular issue before the court in the instant 
case. Amicus Curiae submit the following observations. 
First. The court indicates that it would be im-
proper for a city to punish a misdemeanor for conduct 
which is also punishable under State law. Amicus 
Curiae does not argue on this concept, but with refer-
ence to this conclusion, merely notes: 
(a) That the law on this subject is apparently 
split between two opposing camps in other jurisdictions 
in the United States. 
(b) That dicta in at least two cases from this court 
leaves some confusion in the area and proper judicial 
administration warrants consideration of the dicta in 
the two cases and the resolution of the issue. 
( c) That there is nothing inherently wrong with 
allowing a local government to punish conduct amount-
ing to a felony under State law by a municipal ordi-
nance which is only a misdemeanor since under tra-
ditional theories the State could still punish the indi-
vidual for the same conduct without there being a valid 
claim of double jeopardy. 
Second. Section 32-2-1 Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City, 1965, govern many aspects of sexual 
misconduct not covered under State law. Other sections 
of Chapter 2, Title 32, Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City also control sexual misconduct in instances 
other than are treated under State law. By applying 
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a broad concept of pre-emption as is set forth in the 
court's present opinion many of these ordinances are 
subject to challenge and, consequently, are of question-
able validity. 
Third. It can be argued that Section 32-2-1 (7) 
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City as was 
found objectionable in the Court's opinion is in many 
instances really not inconsistent with conduct prohibited 
under State law governing pandering, but actually 
is much' broader and is aimed at curtailing offensive 
conduct that is not tantamount to pandering. 76-53-8, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, relates to the procuring 
of a female to be an inmate in a house of prostitution 
or persuading a female person to become a prostitute. 
This is not the conduct prohibited by subsection 7 
of the Salt Lake City Ordinances noted above. 76-
53-10 relating to profiting by the earnings of fallen 
women is the only provision that might be deemed 
comparable. In many instances, however, this requires 
that the person receive or agree to receive compensation. 
Although one provision of the statute does seem to 
prohibit directing a female person for the purposes 
of prostitution, it is limited to an act of "prostitution" 
which may require a showing of something greater than 
an offer to perform an act of sexual intercourse for hire 
which is all that is required by the city ordinances. 
Further, the city ordinances cover directions given for 
the purpose of directing one for acts of moral perver-
sion. The city ordinances also cover lewd acts and offers 
to direct which do not appear to be encompassed under 
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the State law. It may well be, therefore, that the city 
ordinances cover many activities not encompassed by 
State law and could only be deemed in conflict with 
State law because of a differing penalty in one instance. 
This court has seemed willing to find that under com-
parable circumstances the conflict was not so great as 
to preclude the enforcement of local ordinances. Salt 
Lake City v. Howe, supra. 
Fourth. Because of the implications of the con-
cept of pre-emption referred to in the Court's opinion, 
efforts by local authorities to control prostitution and 
other sexual misconduct will necessarily be hampered. 
If State law is the only authority under which munici-
palities may act except where there is proof of an act 
of prostitution itself the prosecution of otherwise guilty 
and criminally offensive individuals will be virtually 
impossible. In order to arrest for prostitution or for-
nication which are misdemeanors the arresting officer 
would have to have a warrant or observe the offense 
being committed in his presence. The opportunity for 
the officer to actually observe the criminal offense as 
distinct from the preliminary negotiations is exceed-
ingly rare. .Municipalities should be afforded reason-
able flexibility to deal with special problems relating 
to sexual misconduct within their jurisdiction. The 
Court's opinion as presently structured casts doubt on 
the power of municipalities and local governments 
to so act. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the Court's analysis of the law 
and issues as set forth in its previously issued opinion 
raised sufficient issues of law which have not been fully 
and carefully treated by the court that rehearing is 
warranted and re-exploration of the doctrine of pre-
emption is required. It is respectfully submitted that 
this court should entertain a motion for rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
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